University of Nebraska at Omaha

DigitalCommons@UNO
Student Work

7-1974

Effects of evaluation on creative production
Dalia E. Katilius-Braun
University of Nebraska at Omaha

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork
Part of the Psychology Commons
Recommended Citation
Katilius-Braun, Dalia E., "Effects of evaluation on creative production" (1974). Student Work. 126.
https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork/126

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by
DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for inclusion in Student
Work by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UNO. For
more information, please contact unodigitalcommons@unomaha.edu.

EFFECTS OF EVALUATION ON CREATIVE PRODUCTION

A Thesis
Presented to the
Department of Psychology
and the
Faculty of the Graduate College
University of Nebraska at Omaha
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Dalia E. Ivatilius-Braun
July,

1974

^ 3-7/

UMI Number: EP72772

All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.

Dissertation Publishing

UMI EP72772
Published by ProQuest LLC (2015). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code

ProQuest'
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346

Accepted for the faculty of The Graduate College of the
University of Nebraska at Omaha, in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree Master of Arts.

Graduate Committee:

Name

Department

(J /

r

4^

fly

Chairman

v?

^ mt—

Table of Contents
page
Introduction .......................

1

Method

7

............

Subjects and D e s i g n ...................

7

P r o c e d u r e ............

3

R e s u l t s ...........................
Reliability andAnalysis of Variance ..................
Questionnaire D a t a ........................

9
9
12

Discussion . . ............................................ 13
R e f e r e n c e s .................................................18
Appendix A . .. ................

. 20

Appendix B ............................................... 2 h
Appendix

................................................ 26

Appendix D .....................

27

List of Tables
page
Table I.
Table XX.
Table III.
Table IV.
Table V.

Between-Judge Pearson r Matrix

................. 10

Judge V a r i a n c e s ...................

. . . .

10

Adjusted Cell M e a n s ......................... 11
Analysis of Covariance Summary Table

. . . .

12

Differences between Adjusted Means
(Evaluation)

.................

12

Despite considerable interest in the problem of cre
ativity, both in psychology and in other fields, there is
still no standard definition of the term.

Guilford ( 1 9 6 7 )

defines creativity by making a distinction between convergent
thinking and divergent thinking.

In convergent thinking,

according to Guilford, there is a single right answer or
best answer to a problem, while in divergent thinking there
is not.

He uses the term divergent thinking interchangeably

with creativity.

Ilis research indicates that of the factors

identified as making up divergent thinking, ideational flu
ency, which Guilford defines as fairly rapid generation of
units of verbal or semantic information, has least variance
in common with intelligence.

The correlation between ide

ational fluency and convergent thinking is .01 (Guilford,
Frick, Christensen, & Merrifield,

1957)*

Since a number of

studies have indicated fairly low correlations (around .3 )
between I.Q, scores and scores of creativity, at least in
children (e.g., Getzels & Jackson, 1962), it would seem
that ideational fluency may be an important component of
creativity.
ferently.

Other writers approach the term somewhat di±‘Parnes and Meadow (1959) use the criteria of

uniqueness and usefulness as determiners of good ideas in
their studies on creativity.

Wallach and Kogan (19&5)

speak of total number of ideas generated as well as their
uniqueness within a given subject sample.

Though ideation

al output includes qualitative considerations as well as
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quantitative ones, the present study is concerned only with
the quantitative — number of ideas produced in a divergent
thinking situation.
Most of the research in creativity to date falls into
three areas:

identification of creativity as a concept

through a number of factor-analytic and psychometric studies;
exjiloration of personality variables accounting for differences
between creative and noncreative individuals; and techniques
for increasing creativity in individuals, primarily through
creativity training programs.

The present study focuses on

conditions affecting creative output.

These conditions con

cern the degree of restriction placed on the subject during
the process of ideational production.
While various writers describe the stages of creative
effort in different terms, there is agreement that evaluation
of the creative product should come last in the creative
process.

There is the implication that evaluation occur

ring earlier in the process might be detrimental to the pro
cess and possibly to the end product as well.

Alamshah

( 1 9 7 2 ) suggests that feelings of inferiority, stemming
from criticism by self or others, are one of several common
blocks to creativity.

One can thus speculate that evalua

tion occurring early in the creative process might result
in one or both of two events:

acceptance of the ideas gen

erated thus far as good or at least sufficient, in which
case no further generation is needed; or self-criticism
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of the ideas generated so far, in which case feelings of
inadequacy may block further generation of ideas*
Turning to more experimental evidence, a number of
studies have been conducted at the State University of New
York at Buffalo, assessing the effects of creativity train
ing and various instructions
(Parnes & Noller,

1972 ).

for creative production

The work at Buffalo has consis

tently shown that significantly more good-quality ideas are
produced by individuals under deferred-judgment instructions
(where evaluation is to take place after production) than
under concurrent-judgment instructions (where evaluation is
to take place during production).

They also report that

there is a positive correlation between quantity and quality
of ideas, and that deferred-judgment instructions, by encour
aging a greater quantity of ideas, seem to increase also the
number of good-quality ideas (Parnes & Meadow,

1959 )*

Xn developmental literature, where most of the work on
creativity done so far appears, Wallach and Kogan ( 1 9 6 5 )
claim that playful, nonevaluative conditions produce higher
creativity scores,

Kogan and Morgan (19^9)> on the other

hand, tested creativity in children under 11game-like" and
"test-like" conditions and found no superiority for the
"game" condition.

This finding is supported by Warren and

Luria (1972 ) who tested fifth and sixth graders under in
structions designed to induce low, high and neutral evaluational sets, and found no differences among the different
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evaluational sets.

How can the findings of the latter two

studies be reconciled with the results of the work at Buffalo,
the research of Renner and Renner (1971) who also found nonevaluative, deferred-judgment instructions to be superior,
and the myriad creativity training programs, all of which
reiterate the need for deferring evaluation until after cre
ative production?
An empirical answer must, of course, await further
research, preferably research comparing adults and children
with respect to the effects of evaluation on the creative
process.

Theoretically, however, the dilemma does not

seem irreconcilable if one can entertain one or both of two
possibilities.

First, the notion of a playful, noneval-

uative condition (to borrow Wallach and Kogan*s term) may
be very different and imply different consequences for adults
and children.

Piaget*s position that the difference between

adults and children is often qualitative may very well apply
to attitudinal as well as cognitive phenomena.

Thus, while

in children "playful" tends to mean "different from the rou
tine," especially in the typical educational environment,
and the condition is essentially an environmental one, in
adults "play" may be a much more internalized state, a free
dom from the threat of serious consequences, especially neg
ative ones.

One wonders how serious the consequences of

not doing well on a creativity test were to the fifth and
sixth graders in Warren and Luria's study, and whether there
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was any perceived essential difference between game and test
conditions in Kogan and Morgan*s children.

Both game and test

may well have been equally a break from school routine.
Related to this apparent discrepancy between adults and
children in the effects of evaluation on the creative process
is an idea suggested by the model of an innovative boundaryformulated by Slevin (1971)•

He asserts ‘that in an indus

trial setting there is a relationship between risk and value
of a goal requiring innovative behavior which must be main
tained at a proper balance for innovative behavior to occur,
Xn children being tested in creativity, one might hypothe
size both to be minimal.

In college students, the usual

subjects of the adult studies mentioned above, especially
where the experiment is presented as part of course and stu
dent evaluation, as in the Buffalo studies, the consequen
ces probably assume more importance, and hence the risk is
greater.

For other adults, outside a school environment,

only a goal of real value might evercome the risk involved —
the threat to self-esteem ensuing from evaluation.
Alarnshah (1967)*

In fact,

discussing conditions of creativity,

claims that potential for creativity is enhanced by endeavor
in an area that is high in the individual1s value system,
and to which that individual is willing to devote the great
er part of his work effort.

In an experimental situation,

where the goals are rarely perceived as real or significant,
one might assume that evaluative threat should be at a mini-

6
mum for creative production to emerge.
One further variable of concurrent evaluation that
seems related, and that has been neglected in research on
creativity, is that of bonuses or incentives for creative
effort.

While money is generally believed to be a powerful

motivator, and motivation is conducive to achievement, how
does this relate to creative effort?

How do incentives

affect concurrent judgement, and what are the effects on
quantity and quality of ideational output?
The notion of goal definition and specificity, while
not directly evaluative in the sense that it might threaten
the self-image, may also relate to evaluation of the product.
Mednick ■(1962) in somewhat cryptic fashion comments that
when the problem solver knows the goal he is trying to
reach, the elements of the goal become additional stimuli.
Xn Mednick's view, additional stimuli appear to be desir
able in the creative effort since they expand the range of
raw materials from which novel associations can be made.
In typical goal-oriented situations such as industry, how
ever, goal definition often takes the form of limiting
injunctions such as feasibility and usefulness.

Whether

the verbalization of these requirements in the instructions
for creative production fit Mednick*s notion of elements of
the goal is unclear; the possibility of their effect on the
creative effort should be explored.
This study, then, looks at the effects on ideational
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output of instructions intended to convey nonevaluative,
evaluative and incentive conditions, and goal only versus
goal with feasibility and utility restrictions.

Method
Sub.jects and Design.

Subjects were drawn from male

Business Administration students at the University of Neb
raska at Omaha (UNO) currently enrolled in four sections of
Principles of Management.

Female students were not used

because the number of women in the Business Administration
program at UNO was too small to permit matching across condi
tions.

Subjects were randomly assigned to one of six condi

tions.

All eighty students in the four classes were tested.

Females and those who submitted incomplete responses were
rejected (1^ subjects).

Then, since the smallest cell size

obtained was ten, subjects were randomly rejected from each
of the other cells to arrive at a cell size of ten- on all six
conditions.
The design was a 2 x 3 factorial, with two levels of
Goal Specificity and three levels of Evaluation.
imental task was the same for all subjects:

The exper

to come up with

specific new ideas for products -and/or services that would
be marketable to communities of senior citizens.
one covariate was used:

In addition,

total number of ideas generated on

the Patterns Test (PT), a measure of ideational output (¥allach & Kogan,

1 9 6 3 )#

This measure was used to control for
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the effect of individual differences in ideational fluency.
Procedure.

All subjects were tested in the classroom

during a regular class period of Principles of Management.
Their instructors had announced in the previous class that
their next class would be an experiment, so that subjects
were free to attend or not, though they were encouraged to
do so *
All subjects were given identical oral instructions.
Subjects in differential experimental conditions were given
differential instructions in writing, typed prominently in
their work booklets.

Spot checking after the experiment in

dicated that slibjects were not aware that their instructions
differed from those of anyone else in the room.

Subjects in

different conditions were tested at the same time, in the
same class session, to exclude differences other than written,
instructional ones.
The testing sequence was as follows:

All subjects were

introduced to the PT, and were given about five minutes to
practice on the first page*

They were then given ten minutes

for each of the three pages of the PT.
in Appendix A . )

(A copy of the PT is

They were then told that the second part of

the experiment is an applied task, similar to the kind of
idea-generatioh tasks that occur in business.

They were

asked to read the instructions in their booklets carefully
(differential instructions are listed in Appendix B ) , and
not to discuss either the instructions or their ideas with
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anyone else in the room*
part of the experiment.

Thirty minutes were alloted to this
The experimenter observed that no one

was still working at the end of the thirty minutes.

Finally,

the subjects were asked to fill out a questionnaire on the last
page of their booklets concerning their attitudes about the
experiment.

(A copy of the questionnaire is in Appendix C.)

The ideational output of each subject was scored for
total number of ideas by seven independent judges.

(A copy

of the instructions to the judges is in Appendix D , )
es

The judg

consisted of a sample of professors in the UNO School of

Business Administration in the areas of Management, Marketing,
Accounting, Finance and Decision Science r- the academic equiv
alent of an industrial executive committee.

Each judge scored

the responses separately, avoiding the interactive bias of
group evaluation.

The responses from each subject were typed

exactly as they had been written by the subject, so that the
content remained the same, but judgment on such variables as
neatness or handwriting was avoided.

The response sheets

were coded for subject and condition, so that the judges were
not aware of which subject or condition they were evaluating
at any time.

Results
Reliability and Analysis of Variance.

Pearson r cor

relation coefficients were computed for each pair of judges,
(See Table I.)

Each of the Pearson r*s were then converted
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to z-scores, the z-scores averaged, and the average converted
back to a Pearson r, yielding an average correlation coeffi
cient of +0.93*

High interjudge reliability was thus demon

strated*
Table I
Between-Judge Pearson r Matrix
J2

J1

J4

J3

J6

J5

—

J2

*9260

J3

.9527

.9346

—

—

—

—

J4

*9286

.9659

.9351

—

—

—

J3

.9510

.9234

*9466

.9360

—

—

J6

.9273

.9428

.9429

.9311

.9324

—

J7

•8310

*9186

.8634

.9345

.8813

*9149

Judge variances were computed (see Table II), and an
F

max

test of heterogeneity of variance yielded an F

J

value of 1.3984.

max

Since this failed to exceed the tabulated

F^aX of 2*17 at cx = .05 (Kirk, 1 9 6 8 ), it was decided that
there was homogeneity of variance among the judges*
Table II
Judge Variances
J1

J2

J3

J4

J3

J6

J7

.125

•143

.172

.123

.128

.149

.131

Given high, interjudge reliability and homogeneity of
variance, the number of ideas for each subject were summed
across judges.

Data for the covariate were obtained by

counting the number of ideas generated by each subject on
the PT*

A 2 x 3 factorial analysis of covariance was then

performed.

Adjusted cell means are displyed in Table III.

(These means represent number of ideas times number of
judges averaged across subjects.)

While there were no

Table III
Adjusted Cell Means
No Evaluation

Evaluation

Incentive

Goal Only

7 7 .9 2 U 5

22.3062

25.5721

Goal with
Specifications

71.597*1

27.3899

30.8098

significant effects found for either Goal Specificity or
its interaction with Evaluation, Evaluation was found to
be significant (p < .0001; see Table IV).
The Tulcey A Test of Pairwise Multiple Comparisons was
then performed on the three levels of Evaluation (see Ta
ble V).

With df = 53* the difference between means must

be 16.4059 to be significant at the . 0 5 level, and 2 0 . 7 7 1 2
to be significant at the .01 level (Kirk, 1 9 6 8 ).

The

difference between Evaluation and Incentive was found to
be nonsignificant,

The difference between No Evaluation
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Table XV
Analysis of Covariance Summary Table

Source

df

MS

F

P

Goal Specificity (a )

1

26.2 9 70

0.0571

p < .8121

Evaluation (b )

2

15,523.8633

33.7414

p < .0001

2

200.6311

0.4359

P < .6490

53

460.2313

A X B
Error

—

-

and Evaluation, and the difference between No Evaluation and
Incentive were both significant.

Table V
Differences between Adjusted Means (Evaluation)
No Evaluation
(74.76095)
No Evaluation

----

Evaluation
(24.84305)
49.9129
----

Evaluation

Questionnaire Data.

Incentive
(28.19095)
46.5700
3.3429

Questionnaire results revealed the

subjects* mean age to be 2 6 , with a median age of 2 5 * and a
range of 19 to 47.

The mean number of years of military ex

perience for all subjects was 4.2, with a median of 2 years,
and a range of 0 to 22.

Considering those subjects with more
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than two years of military experience to be in the military,
26 subjects were in the military.

There were no differences

across conditions in either age or military experience.
No subject was aware of the real hypotheses of this
study.

The responses to Question Four ("Did you think of any

ideas that you did not put down?

Why?1’) resulted in a dis

tribution of "yes" responses ranging from four to six in all
six conditions.

Thus all conditions appeared to respond sim

ilarly to this question.

Discussion
Some caution should be exercised in generalizing the
results of this study to an industrial setting without rep
lication of the study using subjects already in industry.
At the same time, the student sample used here deviated
from the typical college student sample.

The average age

of 2 6 is older than the usual average age for college stu
dents.

More than half of the subjects are already in busi

ness or the military.

A number of the remaining subjects

have declared business administration as their major area
of study.

Thus the subject sample can be assumed to fall

somewhere between college students and individuals in an
organization.

The judges represent a sample of areas found

in the management of an organization (with the exception of
manufacturing) and can be assumed to represent a point of
view comparable to that of a decision-making body in an
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organization.

Given this subject/judge sample, then, the

results should have more generalizability to business and
organizational situations than studies using typical college
Student Samples.
To summarize our results, no difference was found
between Goal Only and Goal with Specifications.

There was

also no difference between Evaluation and Incentive.

On the

other hand, No Evaluation was significantly superior to both
Evaluation and Incentive.
In idea-generating tasks in business, as in a marketing
department, for example, it is common to have goal-limiting
injunctions.

Utility and feasibility are especially common

requirements for new ideas.

Yet our results indicate that

these injunctions do not increase the number of ideas gen
erated.
Bonuses as incentive to idea—generation are also believed
to be effective.

The wide-spread use of suggestion boxes is

only one example of the use of monetary incentive for creative
effort.

Yet our results suggest that where an evaluative sit

uation already exists, a bonus may not contribute anything
toward overcoming inferior results.

Within the limits of a

$2.00 bonus, promising a bonus versus not promising anything
made no difference.

It would be useful to study the effects

of incentive further by using a more substantial bonus.

It

would also be of interest to compare the effects of incentive
in an evaluative versus a nonevaluative situation, as an
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attempt to investigate whether the bonus itself implies
evaluation to the subject, or whether it merely fails to
overcome the inhibiting effects of an already expressed
evaluative set.
A sizeable difference was found between nonevaluative
instructions and evaluative instructions, either with or
without incentive.

The nonevaluative conditions were sig

nificantly superior in the number of ideas produced.

This

has implications for industry, if only to question the common
practice of a superior's saying to his subordinate:
don't you come up with some good ideas for . . ."

"Why
This

finding also supports the results of the work done at Buffalo
(Parnes & Noller,

1972) where deferred-judgment instructions

were superior to concurrent-judgment instructions.
Further research needs to be done to evaluate the quality
of ideas produced under these differential conditions, and
the author is currently analyzing qualitative evaluations
of the ideas generated by this sample of subjects.

Results

to date suggest that nonevaluative conditions might produce
not only greater numbers of ideas, but greater numbers of
high-quality ideas as well.
At this point it is not inappropriate to indulge in
some speculation as to what subject variables may be oper
ating to produce the superiority of the No Evaluation con
dition.

Since it was the least restrictive condition that

produced the most superior quantitative result, it seems

16
reasonable to hypothesize that the output under nonrestrictive
conditions most closely approximates baseline creative ability,
while the other conditions inhibit emergence of the baseline
level#

To put it simply% fostering creativity may be a matter

of permitting a person to be creative, rather than helping or
making him creative.
It is interesting to note that the questionnaire failed
to show any real differences among conditions in ideas report
ed as generated but not written down.

At this point, one can

only speculate about the possible causes for the apparent
discrepancy between experimental results and self-report data.
Instructional manipulation produced a significant difference
between No Evaluation and both Evaluation and Incentive, yet
questionnaire data revealed no differences among conditions.
It may be that the questionnaire was not sufficiently sensi
tive to show differences even though those differences existed.
Another interpretation is that some factor such as social
desirability was operating to produce essentially random
results on the questionnaire.

A third possible explanation,

and one that would tie in with a theory of ego-threat in
evaluative situations, is that subjects in the evaluative
conditions were unwilling to admit that they had come up
with tfbadM ideas, or even suppressed the negative results of
an evaluation that was part of the creative process since
these negative results were ego-threatening, and hence the
subjects were truly unaware of these rejected "bad” ideas.
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Both Alamshah’s philosophical speculations (1972) and Slevin*s
model of an innovative boundary (1971) suggest that risk,
possibly of an ego-threatening sort, serves to inhibit
ideational output or creativity.

Further research should be

done to investigate these hypotheses.
Finally, one might speculate whether the imposition of
evaluation does not violate Guilford’s definition of divergent
thinking.

When a subject is asked to come up with good ideas,

there is an automatic implication of some criterion that
differentiates good from bad.

While this does not necessar

ily imply a single correct response, Guilford’s distinguish
ing characteristic of convergent thinking, neither does it
assure the absence of it.

Might evaluation concomitant with

creative production, then, be perceived as convergent think
ing in divergent thinking’s clothing?
In creative activity optimum motivational states may
be quite different from those required for other types of
cognitive behavior.

Guilford’s separation of thinking into

convergent and divergent types is useful in starting to
define the difference between mental ability and creative
ability.

But, whatever creativity is, how does it emerge?

What motivational states, what personality factors, what
situational conditions contribute to the emergence or
suppression of creative productivity?

This paper is an

initial step toward studying this aspect of creativity.
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Appendix A
Patterns Test (PT)
You are going to look at some drawings.
See how many
different things you can think of that these drawings might
be •
Here is an example.
What might this drawing be?

Two things this might be are written in
it might be
a porcupine, or the sun coming up. Think of some more things
it could be and write them in the blank spaces.
You d o n ’t have to write long answers — just enough so
we know what your idea was,
1/hen you are ready to start on the first drawing on the
next page, put your pencil down and look up.

PLEASE DO NOT TURN THIS PAGE UNTIL YOU ARE ASKED TO.

21
1.
What do you think this drawing might be?

PLEASE DO NOT TURN THIS PAGE UNTIL YOU ARE ASKED TO.

22

2.
Wliat do you think this drawing: might be?

PLEASE DO NOT TURN THIS PAGE UNTIL YOU ARE ASKED TO

What do you think this drawing might be?

PLEASE DO NOT TURN THIS PAGE UNTIL YOU ARE ASKED TO

2k

Appendix B
Instructions for Differential Conditions
Condition 11 (Goal Only; No Evaluation):
Please list all the ideas that come to your mind without
judging them in any way. Forget about the quality of
ideas entirely.
The key point is only quantity on this
task. Express any idea that comes to your mind.
Condition 12 (Goal Only; Evaluation):
Please list all the good ideas you can think up. A
group of judges from the Business Administration faculty
will evaluate the quantity and quality of good ideas you
produce. Don*t put down any idea unless you feel it is
a good one.
Condition 13 (Goal Only; Incentive);
Please list all the good ideas you can think up. A
group of judges from the Business Administration faculty
will evaluate the quantity and quality of good ideas you
produce.
Don*t put down any idea unless you feel it is
a good one.
In addition, a bonus of $2.00 will be awarded for-each
of the ten best ideas in the group. We will mail the
bonuses for the best ideas within two weeks.
Please
write down your mailing address in the space below.
Condition 21 (Goal with Specifications; No Evaluation):
Please list all the ideas that come to
are feasible and useful. Forget about
ideas entirely.
The key point is only
task. Express any idea which comes to
is feasible and useful.

your mind that
the quality of
quantity on this
your mind that

Condition 22 (Goal with Specifications; Evaluation);
Please list all the good ideas that are also feasible
and useful that you can think up. A group of judges
from the Business Administration faculty will evaluate
the quantity and quality of good ideas you produce.
Don*t put down any idea, even a feasible and useful one,
unless you feel it is a good idea.
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Condition 23 (Goal with Specifications; Incentive):
Please list all the good ideas that are also feasible
and useful that you can think up. A group of judges
from the Business Administration faculty will evaluate
the quantity and quality of good ideas you produce.
Don't put down any idea, even a feasible and useful
one, unless you feel it is a good idea.
In addition, a bonus of $2,00 will be awarded for each
of the ten best ideas in the group. We will mail the
bonuses for the best ideas within two weeks.
Please
write down your mailing address in the space below.
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Appendix C
Bio,graphical Infonnation
S. S. #:

NAME
AGE:

YEARS OF MILITARY EXPERIENCE

Questionnaire
1•

I/ere you aware of what hypothesis was being tested in this
study?

2,

What do you think was being studied in this experiment?

3.

What constraints or limitations did you feel were placed
on your responses in this experiment?

Did you think of any ideas that you did not put down?
Why?

5.

How did you feel about participating in this experiment?
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Appendix D
Instructions to Judges

Tour task is to determine iiow many ideas tiiere are on
each sheet.
BEYOND

THESE IDEAS ARE NOT TO BE EVALUATED IN ANY WAY

DETERMINING SEPARATE, DISTINCT

IDEAS.

There may be

cases where a whole paragraph or more is only one idea with
elaborations.

On the other hand, only one sentence or even

phrase may contain more than one separate idea.
4

Your judgments on quantity should follow these steps:
A.

Read the entire set of* responses for all subjects
first.

This will give you a feeling for the kind

of response population you are dealing with, and
will make subsequent discriminations easier.
B.

Then decide how many separate ideas there are on a
given response sheet and identify them from 111M to
"n" on the lines at the left

margin.

Some of the

responses have been given inthe form of para
graphs rather than separate items.

The lengthier

ones have been double-spaced for easier reading
and scoring.

If there are no lines for identifying

and marking the number of a separate idea on the
left margin, please make them yourself.
C.

Finally, indicate the total number of ideas for
the given response sheet at the bottom of the sheet.

